We propose a methodology for estimating the competition e¤ects from entry when …rms sell di¤erentiated products. We …rst derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss' entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence and to measure the magnitude of competition e¤ects. We then show how to augment the traditional entry model with a revenue equation. This revenue equation serves to adjust the ETRs by the extent of market expansion from entry, and leads to unbiased estimates of the competition e¤ects from entry. We apply our approach to seven di¤erent local service sectors. We …nd that entry typically leads to signi…cant market expansion, implying that traditional ETRs may substantially underestimate the competition e¤ects from entry. In most sectors, the second entrant reduces markups by at least 30%, whereas the third or subsequent entrants have smaller or insigni…cant e¤ects. In one sector, we …nd that even the second entrant does not reduce markups, consistent with a recent decision by the competition authority.
Introduction
An important question in industrial organization is how market structure a¤ects the intensity of competition. To address this question a variety of empirical approaches have been developed, each with di¤erent strengths and weaknesses depending on the available data.
1 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) developed an innovative approach applicable to local service sectors: they infer the e¤ects of entry on competition from the relationship between the number of entrants and market size. The intuition of their approach is simple. If market size has to increase disproportionately to support additional …rms, entry can be interpreted to intensify the degree of competition. Conversely, if market size increases proportionally with the number of …rms, then additional entry is interpreted to leave the degree of competition una¤ected. To implement their approach, Bresnahan and Reiss propose the concept of the entry threshold ratio (henceforth ETR). The ETR is the percentage per-…rm market size increase that is required to support an additional …rm. An estimated ETR greater than 1 indicates that entry leads to stronger competition, whereas an ETR equal to 1 indicates that entry does not intensify competition.
A major strength of Bresnahan and Reiss' methodology is that it can be applied with relatively modest data requirements. One basically needs data on a cross-section of local markets, with information on the number of …rms per market, population size and other market demographics as control variables. No information on prices or marginal costs is required. This also makes their approach potentially appealing from a competition policy perspective. It can be used as a …rst monitoring tool to assess which sectors potentially face competition problems and require more detailed investigation.
A central assumption of Bresnahan and Reiss' methodology is that …rms produce homogeneous products: holding prices constant, an additional entrant only leads to business stealing and does not create market expansion. This assumption is potentially problematic since new entrants may be di¤erentiated from existing …rms, either because they o¤er di¤erent product attributes or because they are located at a di¤erent place. In both cases, additional entry would raise demand (holding prices constant).
In this paper we develop a more general economic model to assess the competition e¤ects from entry. The model allows for the possibility that …rms sell di¤erentiated products, i.e. additional entry can create market expansion. We …rst derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss' ETRs can be used as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry. We …nd that this is only possible if products are homogeneous, i.e. additional 1 entry only entails business stealing and no market expansion. We then ask when ETRs can be used as a measure for the magnitude of competition entry e¤ects. We show that ETRs are generally a biased measure for the percentage markup e¤ect due to entry, except in the special case where products are homogeneous and the price elasticity of market demand is unity. More generally, if products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, ETRs typically tend to underestimate the percentage markup e¤ects from competition.
Our theoretical framework also provides a natural way to extend the Bresnahan and Reiss'approach to obtain an unbiased measure for the magnitude of the markup e¤ects due to entry. We propose to augment the traditional ordered probit entry model with a revenue equation. The entry model speci…es the equilibrium number of …rms that can be sustained under free entry. The revenue equation speci…es per …rm revenues as a function of the number of …rms and enables one to estimate the total market expansion e¤ects (consisting of both the direct e¤ects from increased product di¤erentiation and any indirect e¤ects through possible price changes). To obtain an unbiased estimate of the markup e¤ects from entry, the traditional ETRs from the entry model should be suitably adjusted by the total market expansion e¤ects estimated from the revenue equation.
To implement our approach, we study a variety of local service sectors, for which revenue data are increasingly becoming available.
2 More speci…cally, we consider architects, bakeries, butchers, ‡orists, plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For each sector, we constructed a cross-section dataset of local markets (towns) in Belgium, with information on market revenues, the number of entrants, market size (population) and market demographics. Estimating the single-equation entry model yields the traditional ETRs, and we estimate these to be close to 1. This would seem to indicate that entry does not lead to intensi…ed competition. In fact, we even estimate some ETRs to be below 1, which would be inconsistent with the hypothesis of increased competition. However, estimation of the revenue equation shows that entry may often lead to important total market expansion, especially for architects, ‡orists and real estate agents. This implies that the traditional ETRs underestimate the competition e¤ects from entry. Accounting for the estimated total market expansion e¤ects leads to stronger competition e¤ects, especially from the second entrant. Third and subsequent entrants have more limited or insigni…cant competition e¤ects. In one 2 The increased access to revenue data has recently also been exploited in a variety of other settings.
For example, Syverson (2004) uses plant-level revenue data in the ready-mixed concrete industry, to assess how demand factors a¤ect the distribution of productivity. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) consider the relationship between market size and the size distribution of establishments. They …nd that establishments tend to be larger in large markets, consistent with models of large-group competition. Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2005) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2010) extend Hall's (1988) approach to estimate markups using plant-level data on revenues in combination with variable input expenditures.
sector, bakeries, we …nd no signi…cant competition e¤ects, not even from the second entrant. Incidentally, this sector has recently been investigated by the local competition authority because of price …xing concerns. Our paper relates to the growing empirical literature on static entry models. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) proposed their ordered probit model of free entry to infer competition e¤ects from entry by doctors, dentists, car dealers and plumbers. Asplund and Sandin (1999) and Manuszak (2002) are examples of applications of this model to other sectors. Berry (1992) considered a more general model of entry with heterogeneous …rms. Mazzeo (2002) , Seim (2006) and Schaumans and Verboven (2008) allow for multiple types of …rms or endogenize the choice of type. Other recent work on static entry models has focused on di¤erent ways of addressing the multiplicity problem in entry games with …rm heterogeneity; see Berry and Reiss (2007) for a recent overview of the literature. In contrast with this recent literature, we maintain the basic entry model that can be applied to market-level data and we focus on the interpretation of ETRs. We show how to augment the entry model with a revenue equation to draw more reliable inferences about the competition e¤ects from entry.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, showing under which conditions ETRs can be used as a test for the presence and a measure for the magnitude of competition e¤ects. Section 3 presents the econometric model and Section 4 the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical framework
We …rst describe the model. We then introduce the concept of the ETR, and derive conditions under which ETRs can be used to test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry. Finally, we show how to incorporate revenue data to adjust ETRs to measure the magnitude of competition e¤ects from entry in an unbiased way.
The model
There are N …rms, competing in a local market with a population size S. Each …rm has the same constant marginal cost c > 0 and incurs a …xed cost f > 0 (independent of the number of …rms).
Demand Firms do not necessarily produce homogeneous products, but in equilibrium they charge the same industry price p. The demand per …rm and per capita as a function of this common price p and the number of …rms N is q(p; N ). This is the traditional Chamberlinian DD curve (in per capita terms). Similarly, industry demand per capita is Q(p; N ) = q(p; N )N . Denote the price elasticity of industry demand by " = Q p p Q = q p p q . We ignore the fact that N can only take integer values here, but we take this into account in the empirical analysis.
We make the following three assumptions about demand.
Assumption 1 q p 0, or equivalently, Q p = q p N 0:
Assumption 2 q N 0:
The …rst assumption simply says that per-…rm or industry demand is weakly decreasing in the common industry price p. The second assumption says that per-…rm demand is weakly decreasing in the number of …rms N : holding prices constant, additional entry either leads to business stealing (if products are substitutes) or does not a¤ect per-…rm demand (if products are independent). Finally, the third assumption says that industry demand is weakly increasing in N : holding prices constant, entry either leads to market expansion because of product di¤erentiation, or leaves industry demand una¤ected if products are homogeneous.
These assumptions clearly cover the special case in which products are homogeneous, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . In this case, industry demand per capita can be written as
. It immediately follows that q N = q=N < 0 and Q N = q + q N N = 0. Hence, with homogeneous products entry leads to full business stealing and no market expansion (holding prices constant).
More generally, the assumptions allow for product di¤erentiation with symmetric …rms. To illustrate, consider Berry and Waldfogel's (1999) symmetric nested logit model used to study product variety: the …rst nest includes all …rms'products, and the second nest contains the outside good or no-purchase alternative. With identical …rms and identical prices, the nested logit per …rm and per capita demand function is:
where > 0 is the price parameter and 0 1 is the nesting parameter. It can easily be 4 veri…ed that:
If = 1, then q N = q=N and Q N = 0, so all …rms'products are perceived as homogeneous (relative to the outside good).
Pro…ts and prices Now consider pro…ts and the symmetric equilibrium price in the market. For a common industry price p a …rm's pro…ts are
Suppose …rst that all N …rms behave as a cartel. In this case, the equilibrium price as a function of N is p m (N ), de…ned by the …rst-order condition
More generally, let the symmetric equilibrium price as a function of the number of …rms N be given by p(N ) p m (N ). In many oligopoly models, including the Cournot and Bertrand models, this equilibrium price is weakly decreasing in N , p 0 0. We can then write a …rm's equilibrium pro…ts as a function of the number of …rms N as:
In the next two subsections we will decompose pro…ts in two di¤erent ways. De…ne the variable pro…ts per …rm and per capita by v(N ) (p(N ) c) q(p(N ); N ), the revenues per …rm and per capita by r(N ) p(N )q(p(N ); N ), and the Lerner index or percentage markup by (N )
. We can then write
The expression on the …rst line contains variable pro…ts per …rm and per capita, similar to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . The expression on the second line rewrites variable pro…ts as markups times revenue per …rm and per capita. As we will show in the next two subsections, this second expression provides useful additional information to assess the e¤ects of competition on markups, provided that data on revenues are available. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) introduce the concept of the entry threshold and entry threshold ratio as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry. The entry threshold is the critical market size required to support a given number of …rms, and is derived from the zero-pro…t condition (N ) = 0. Using (2), this gives
ETRs to test for the presence of competition e¤ects
Bresnahan and Reiss argue that entry does not lead to increased competition if the entry threshold increases proportionally with the number of …rms. For example, entry would not lead to more competition if a doubling of the market size is required to support twice as many …rms. Conversely, entry creates intensi…ed competition if the entry threshold increases disproportionately with the number of …rms. For example, competition intensi…es if a tripling of the market size would be required to support twice as many …rms.
Based on this intuition, Bresnahan and Reiss propose the entry threshold ratio, or ETR, as a unit-free measure to test for the presence of competition e¤ects. The ETR is de…ned as the per-…rm entry threshold required to support N …rms, relative to the per-…rm entry threshold to support N 1 …rms, i.e.
ET R(N
One can then test the null hypothesis, ET R(N ) = 1, that the N -th entrant does not lead to more competition. We now assess this interpretation formally, starting from our more general model where products are not necessarily homogeneous, i.e. allowing for market expansion upon entry.
in (4), we can write the ETR in a simple form:
where V (N ) = v(N )N is per capita industry variable pro…ts. The ETR is therefore just the ratio of industry variable pro…ts with N and N 1 …rms. It follows immediately from (5) that the ET R(N ) > 1 if and only if V 0 (N ) < 0, i.e.
if and only if industry variable pro…ts are strictly decreasing in N . To see under which circumstances this is the case, di¤erentiate V (N ) = v(N )N using (1), and rearrange to obtain
Suppose …rst that products are homogeneous, which is the special case considered by Bresnahan and Reiss. In this case, q + q N N = 0 so that the second term in (6) vanishes. Since 1 " 0, it follows that V 0 < 0 (and hence ET R(N ) > 1) if and only if p 0 < 0.
Similarly, V 0 = 0 if and only if p 0 = 0. We can therefore con…rm, and make more precise, Bresnahan and Reiss'justi…cation for using ETRs as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry, when products are homogeneous:
Proposition 1 Suppose that products are homogenous. ET R(N ) > 1 if and only if entry leads to a price decrease ( p 0 < 0). ET R(N ) = 1 if and only if entry does not a¤ect the price
Bresnahan and Reiss also provide examples from oligopoly models to argue that the ETRs are declining in N . Intuitively, entry may be expected to have larger e¤ects on competition if one starts o¤ from few …rms with strong market power, as can be con…rmed from examples such as the Cournot model. Formally, it follows from (5) that the ETRs are declining if and only if the industry variable pro…ts are convex in N , V 00 > 0. While this may often be the case, it is not generally true, not even if products are homogeneous. A simple counterexample is a repeated game with price setting …rms: pro…ts are monopoly pro…ts for su¢ ciently low N , and then drop to zero above a critical level for N .
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Suppose now that products are di¤erentiated. This means that additional entry implies market expansion (holding prices constant), i.e. q + q N N > 0, so that the second term in (6) becomes positive. It follows immediately that V 0 > 0 (and hence ET R(N ) < 1) if
provided products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (since then p approaches p m or approaches 1=", so that the …rst term in (6) vanishes and the second term dominates). We can conclude the following about the use of entry thresholds when products are di¤erentiated:
Proposition 2 Suppose products are di¤erentiated. ET R(N ) < 1 if entry does not a¤ect the price ( p 0 = 0) or even if entry leads to a price decrease ( p 0 < 0) provided products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
Product di¤erentiation can thus explain occasional …ndings in applied work of ETRs less than 1. (For example, Bresnahan and Reiss report ET R(3) = 0:79 for dentists.) Intuitively, if entry leads to substantial market expansion and does not intensify competition by very much, it is possible that market size increases less than proportionately with the number of …rms.
To summarize, Propositions 1 and 2 identify conditions under which the null hypothesis ET R(N ) = 1 is reasonable as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects. It turns out that this approach is reasonable only if products are homogeneous, but not more generally if products are di¤erentiated.
ETRs to measure the magnitude of competition e¤ects
Having identi…ed conditions under which ETRs form a reasonable basis to test for the presence of the competition e¤ects from entry, we now ask under which conditions ETRs provide an unbiased measure for the magnitude of the competition e¤ects. De…ne this magnitude as the percentage drop in the Lerner index, (N 1)= (N ).
To address this question, we now start from (3) instead of (2) to rewrite the entry threshold as
This can be substituted in the de…nition of the ETR (4) to rewrite it as:
where 
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As before, suppose …rst that the products are homogeneous, as in Bresnahan and Reiss. We have that q + q N N = 0, so that the second term in (8) vanishes. For p 0 < 0, we then
We can conclude the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that products are homogeneous. The ETR is a correct measure of the percentage markup drop due to entry, ET R(N ) = (N 1)= (N ), if and only if " = 1. It underestimates (overestimates) the percentage markup drop if and only if " > 1 ( " < 1 ).
For example, consider an estimated ET R = 1:3, as roughly found for entry by the second and third …rm in Manuszak's study of the 19th century U.S. brewery industry. Assuming homogeneous products, this can be interpreted as a markup drop by 30% following the introduction of a second and third competitor, if and only if the price elasticity of market demand is unity.
Proposition 3 shows that it is di¢ cult to draw general conclusions about the direction of bias, since one needs to know the level of the price elasticity of industry demand. But the direction of bias is clear in the special case where industry behaves close to a perfect cartel. In this case, we have that " > 1 (since marginal cost c > 0). Hence, if the industry behaves close to a perfect cartel, the entry threshold would underestimate the magnitude of the markup drop following entry. Now suppose that products are di¤erentiated, q + N q N > 0. The second term in (8) is then positive, so that the ETR is more likely to underestimate the markup drop. More precisely, de…ne " as the critical elasticity such that R 0 = 0, i.e.
For q + q N N > 0 and p 0 < 0, we have that " < 1, so that the ETR would also underestimate the markup drop for an elasticity below 1 but su¢ ciently close to 1. More precisely, we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose products are di¤erentiated. The ETR underestimates (overestimates) the percentage markup drop (N 1)= (N ) if and only if " > " ( " < " ), where " < 1.
To summarize, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the ETR is more likely to underestimate the percentage markup drop from entry if the industry behaves close to a cartel (so that " > 1) and/or if products are strongly di¤erentiated (substantial market expansion from entry).
To obtain this conclusion we made use of the (per capita) industry revenue function. Provided that revenue data are available, it also suggests a natural way to obtain an unbiased measure of the competition e¤ect from entry. Indeed, using (7) we can write the percentage markup drop as
The markup drop due to entry is thus equal to Bresnahan and Reiss'ETR, multiplied by the percentage industry revenue e¤ects from entry. In the next section, we develop an empirical model that augments the traditional entry model with a revenue function. This leads to the "adjusted ETR"as an unbiased estimate of the competition e¤ects from entry. The approach requires market-level revenue data, in addition to data on the number of entrants and market demographics used in standard entry models.
Remark: absolute margins The above discussion focused on how to obtain an unbiased measure for the magnitude of the competition e¤ect from entry as de…ned by percentage drop in the Lerner index (or percentage margin), (N 1)= (N ). One may also ask this question for the percentage drop in the absolute margin,
can easily verify that (7) can be rewritten as
The bias of the ETR as a competition measure now depends on the reduced form demand function Q(N ) instead of the reduced form revenue function R(N ). The ETR is an unbiased measure of the percentage drop in absolute margins if and only if Q 0 = 0. Similarly, the ETR underestimates (overestimates) the percentage drop in absolute margins if and only if
The counterparts of Proposition 3 and 4 are simple. The ETR is an unbiased estimated of the percentage drop in absolute margins only if products are homogeneous (q + q N N = 0) and demand is perfectly inelastic (" = 0). If either condition is violated, we have Q 0 > 0, so that the ETR will generally underestimate the percentage drop in absolute margins. This discussion also shows that the appropriate measure of competition depends on data availability. With revenue data (as in most application) it is natural to focus on the percentage drop in the Lerner index (N ). With quantity data it is natural to focus on the percentage drop in the absolute margin p(N ) c.
Econometric model
We …rst specify a standard empirical entry model without revenue data in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . We show how to estimate this model and compute ETRs, based on a dataset with the number of …rms and market characteristics for a cross-section of local markets. We then show how to extend the standard entry model with a revenue equation, and how to compute adjusted ETRs as an unbiased measure of competition e¤ects from entry.
In both cases the empirical entry model assumes that …rm pro…ts are an unobserved, latent variable. But bounds can be inferred based on the assumption that there is free entry, i.e. …rms enter if and only if this is pro…table.
Simple entry model
If revenue data are not available, we start from the pro…t function (2)
where v 0 < 0. Both the (per capita) variable pro…ts and the …xed costs component are unobserved. However, bounds can be inferred based on the assumption that there is free entry. Upon observing N …rms, we can infer that N …rms are pro…table, whereas N + 1 …rms are not:
or equivalently
Consider the following logarithmic speci…cation for the ratio of variable pro…ts over …xed costs
where X is a vector of observable market characteristics X, N represents the …xed e¤ect of N …rms, and ! is an unobserved error term. 5 Assume that N +1 < N < : : :, i.e. additional …rms reduce the variable pro…ts over …xed cost ratio (because of reduced demand and/or reduced markup). We can write the entry conditions as
Estimation To estimate the model by maximum likelihood, assume ! is normally distributed N (0; ). The probability of observing N …rms is
This is a standard ordered probit model, where the N are the "cut-points"or entry e¤ects. Note that the variance is identi…ed because of the assumption that variable pro…ts increase proportionally with market size S. 6 See Berry and Reiss (2008) for a more general discussion on identi…cation in entry models.
Constructing ETRs Based on the estimated parameters one can compute the entry threshold, i.e. the critical market size to support N …rms. Using (9) and (10), evaluated at ! = 0, the entry threshold to support N …rms is
The ETR is the ratio of the per-…rm market size to support N versus N 1 …rms. Using (4), this is
So in our logarithmic speci…cation the ETRs only depend on the di¤erences in the consecutive "cut-points"of the ordered probit model; they do not depend on the market characteristics X.
As shown in the previous section, the ETRs are no good measure of the competitive e¤ects from entry if products are di¤erentiated. Furthermore, even if products are homogenous, ETRs can only be used to test the null hypothesis of no competition e¤ects, but not to measure the magnitude of the competition e¤ects. These considerations motivate augmenting the entry model to include revenue data in the analysis. We turn to this next.
Simultaneous entry and revenue model
If we observe revenues per …rm and per capita r = r(N ), we can disentangle the variable pro…ts per capita into a percentage markup and a revenue component, v(N ) = (N )r(N ). We can then start from the pro…t function (3):
Upon observing N …rms, we can now infer that
This again gives rise to the ordered probit model. But since we observe per-…rm revenues r = r(N ), we can separately specify an equation for revenues and markups (rather than only for variable pro…ts). We specify revenues per capita to depend on observed market characteristics X, the number of …rms N and an unobserved market-speci…c error term . We consider both a constant elasticity and a …xed e¤ects speci…cation:
where X are observed market demographics is an unobserved error term a¤ecting revenues, is the (constant) elasticity of per-…rm revenues r with respect to N , and N are …xed entry e¤ects.
To interpret the e¤ect of N on r, one should bear in mind that r(N ) p(N )q(p(N ); N ). Hence, the elasticity or the …xed e¤ects N capture both the direct e¤ect through increased product di¤erentiation and the indirect e¤ect through a possible price change. More formally, using (8) we can write the elasticity of r with respect to N as:
The second term q N (N=q) is the direct e¤ect through increased product di¤erentiation. By assumptions 2 and 3, q N (N=q) 2 ( 1; 0): if q N (N=q) = 1, products are homogeneous and there is only business stealing. If q N (N=q) = 0, products are independent and there is only market expansion. The …rst term is the indirect e¤ect through a possible price change. If the …rst term is small (because of a modest price e¤ect p 0 (N=p) and " relatively close to 1), then we can interpret our estimate of r 0 (N=r) as the extent of business stealing versus market expansion. For example, in the constant elasticity speci…cation, an estimate of close to -1 would indicate that entry mainly involves business stealing (homogeneous products), and close to 0 would indicate that entry mainly involves market expansion (independent products). It will be convenient to follow this interpretation when discussing the empirical results. However, we stress that this interpretation only holds approximately, since also captures indirect revenue e¤ects through price changes. Next, we specify the ratio of markups over …xed costs as a function of observed market characteristics X, the number of …rms and an unobserved market-speci…c error term :
where N > N +1 > : : :, i.e. markups are decreasing in the number of …rms. Substituting the revenue speci…cation (15) or (16) and the markup speci…cation (17) in (14), we can write the entry conditions as
where we de…ne This gives rise to the following simultaneous model for revenues and the number of …rms:
Estimation This is a simultaneous ordered probit and demand model. It has a similar structure as in Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2010) , although they derive it from a rather di¤erent setting with coordinated entry. The model has the following endogeneity problem. We want to estimate the causal e¤ect of N on r, but N is likely to be correlated with the demand error . Econometrically, the error terms and ! are correlated because they contain the common component . Intuitively, …rms are more likely to enter in markets where they expect demand to be high, leading to spurious correlation between the number of …rms and total revenues per capita N r, or a bias towards too much market expansion and too little business stealing. Since we will use the estimated market expansion e¤ects to obtain a proper estimate of the competition e¤ects, it is crucial that we do not overestimate market expansion. Fortunately, population size S serves as a natural exclusion restriction to identify the causal e¤ect of N on r. It does not directly a¤ect per capita revenues, yet it is correlated with N , since …rms are more likely to enter and cover their …xed costs in large markets. In di¤erent contexts, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2010) have used similar identi…cation strategies.
To estimate the model by maximum likelihood, suppose that and are normally distributed, so that ! is also normally distributed. We then obtain the following likelihood contributions. For markets with N = 0 we have
and for markets with N > 0 we have
where = ln r X N .
Constructing ETRs and percentage markup drops When the entry model is augmented with revenue data, we can still compute the ETR as before. It is given by
Furthermore, it is now also possible to directly compute the percentage markup drop following entry. Using (17), we can write this percentage markup drop as
To express this in terms of the estimated parameters for the …xed e¤ects revenue speci…cation, we can substitute the de…nition N N + N to obtain:
where the second equality follows from the de…nition of the ETR. Similarly, for the constant elasticity revenue equation, we can substitute the de…nition N ln N + N to obtain
Consistent with the discussion in Section 2, this shows for both speci…cations how the ETRs should be adjusted by the estimated revenue parameters to obtain an unbiased estimate for the markup drop after entry. The simple ETRs can only be used as an unbiased measure in the special case where
in the ‡exible speci…cation, and = 1 in the restricted speci…cation. Intuitively, in both cases this requires that entry only leads to business stealing and not to any market expansion.
Empirical analysis
We organize the discussion of the empirical analysis as follows. We …rst present the dataset for the various local service sectors. Next, we discuss the results from estimating the entry model and the revenue model separately. This leads to the construction of traditional Bresnahan and Reiss entry threshold ratios. They do not yet take into account the existence of market expansion from entry, and can be used as a benchmark for our subsequent results. Finally, we present the results for the simultaneous model of entry and demand, leading to estimates of competition e¤ects or "adjusted entry threshold ratios" that take into account market expansion e¤ects.
Dataset
We analyze seven di¤erent local service sectors: architects, bakeries, butchers, ‡orists, plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For each sector, we have constructed a crosssectional data set of more than 800 local markets (towns) in Belgium in 2007. The main variables are …rm revenues per capita r, the number of …rms N , population size S and other market demographics X.
Selection of sectors Based on our research proposal, the Belgian Federal Ministry of Economic A¤airs made available a list of local service sectors at the 4-digit or 5-digit NACE code for empirical analysis. From this list we …rst eliminated sectors where the relevant market is clearly not local, such as TV-production houses. Furthermore, to avoid possible complications stemming from multi-market competition, we restricted attention to sectors where the average number of establishments per …rm is less than 3. Sectors with many chains, such as travel agencies and clothes stores, were therefore also eliminated from the analysis. This resulted in a list of seven local service sectors: architects, bakeries, butchers, ‡orists, plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For all these sectors the median number of establishments per company is 1, the 75-percentile is no larger than 2 and the 90-percentile is no larger than 5.
Geographic market de…nition For each sector, we de…ne the geographic market at the level of the ZIP-code. This roughly corresponds to the de…nition of a town in Belgium, and it is more narrow than the administrative municipality, which on average consists of about 5 towns. The market de…nition appears reasonable for the considered sectors, as they relate to frequently purchased goods or to services where local information is important. The extent of the geographic market may of course vary somewhat across sectors. Nevertheless, for simplicity and consistency we decided to use the same market de…nition for all sectors. To avoid problems with overlapping markets, we only retain the non-urban areas, i.e. towns with a population density below 800 inhabitants per km 2 and a market size lower than 15,000 inhabitants.
Construction of the variables and summary statistics The number of …rms N is the number of companies in the market, as constructed from the business registry database. Revenues per …rm and per capita r are computed at the company level from the V.A.T. sectoral database. Ideally, we would want to use data at the establishment level but this information is incomplete. As discussed above, we therefore focus on sectors with a low number of establishments per …rm (no chains). Furthermore, we restrict attention to companies with at most two establishments in the country.
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The data on the number of …rms N and revenues r are speci…c to each of the seven di¤er-ent sectors. In addition to these endogenous variables, we also observe the common variables population size S and a vector of other market demographics X. This vector consists of the market surface, personal income/capita, the demographic composition of the population (% women, % foreigners, % unemployed and % in various age categories), and a regional dummy variable for Flanders. The vector X enters both the revenue and entry equation. In contrast, population size S only enters the entry equation and therefore serves as an exclusion restriction for the revenue equation to identify the causal e¤ect of N on r. Table 1 gives a complete list of the variables and their de…nitions, and presents basic summary statistics for the common variables S and X, as observed for the cross-section of 835 non-urban markets. Table 2 provides more detailed summary statistics for the sectorspeci…c variables, revenues per …rm and per capita r and the number of …rms N . The top panel shows the number of markets with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more …rms. Most sectors have broad market coverage with a common presence of at least one …rm per market. This is most notable for restaurants, since there are only 93 markets without a restaurant. The middle and bottom panels of Table 2 show the means and standard deviations for the number of …rms N and revenues r across markets.
Preliminary evidence
We now discuss the results from estimating the entry model and the revenue model separately. This leads to traditional Bresnahan and Reiss entry threshold ratios. It also provides a …rst indication on the extent of market expansion (as opposed to business stealing) following entry, yet without accounting for endogeneity of N for now. Table 3 shows the empirical results per sector from estimating the ordered probit entry model. Consistent with other work, population size ln S is the most important determinant of …rm entry, with a positive and highly signi…cant parameter for all sectors. 9 Several variables of the age structure also tend to have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect across sectors, in particular the %young and %old, relative to the reference group of young adults with age between 25-40 years. The e¤ect of several other variables di¤ers across sectors, both in sign and magnitudes. For example, markets with a high income per capita tend to have more architects, ‡orists and real estate agents, but fewer bakeries. Generally speaking, it is not straightforward to interpret these parameters, as the variables may capture several e¤ects (variable pro…ts, …xed costs) and may be collinear with other variables (e.g. income and unemployment). While the control variables are not of direct interest, it is still important to control for them to allow for di¤erent sources of variation across markets.
Entry model
The ordered probit model also includes the entry e¤ects or "cut-points" N . We transform these parameters to construct the entry thresholds (for a representative market with average characteristics) and the per …rm entry threshold ratios (which are independent of the other characteristics). This is based on the expressions (12) and (13) derived earlier. Table 4 shows the computed entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios. To illustrate, …rst consider butchers (third column). The entry threshold, i.e. the minimum population size to support one butcher in a town, is 1,166. It increases to 2,736 to support a second butcher and to 4,905 to support a third butcher. The pattern is slightly disproportional, i.e. the minimum population size to support a given number of …rms increases disproportionately with the number of …rms. This is re ‡ected in the ETRs. For example, ET R(2) = 1:17, which means that the minimum population size per …rm should increase by an extra 17% to support a second …rm. Under the homogeneous goods assumption of the Bresnahan and Reiss model, this can be interpreted as an indication that entry intensi…es competition between butchers. Now consider all sectors. Table 4 shows that the ETRs for the third, fourth or …fth entrant are signi…cantly greater than 1 in about half of the cases, and insigni…cantly di¤erent from 1 in the remaining half. In the traditional Bresnahan and Reiss' framework, this would indicate mixed evidence on the competitive e¤ects of entry from the third entrant onwards. Table 4 also shows that the ETR for the second entrant is only signi…cantly greater than 1 for one sector, butchers; it does not di¤er signi…cantly from 1 for four sectors; and it is even signi…cantly less than 1 for the remaining two sectors, architects and real estate agents. The latter …nding contradicts the competition interpretation of ETRs, as it would suggest that competition becomes weaker when a second …rm enters the market. As we will show below, an alternative interpretation is the presence of signi…cant market expansion when a second …rm enters the market. Table 5 shows the empirical results per sector from simple OLS regressions of the restricted revenue speci…cation (15), i.e. regressions of ln r on ln N and X. Since the model is estimated with OLS, we do not yet account for the endogeneity of N so we should be cautious at this point in drawing causal inferences on market expansion versus business stealing from entry. First, consider the control variables X. In contrast with the entry equation, the parameters are signi…cant for most variables and usually have the same sign across the various sectors. Per capita revenues tend to be larger in markets with a low surface area, a low personal income, a low fraction of unemployed, and a high fraction of kids/young or old (relative to the base young adult group). Now consider the parameter on ln N . The parameter is negative and signi…cant for …ve out of seven sectors, and insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero for the remaining two sectors ( ‡orists and real estate agents). For the …ve sectors where the parameter is negative, it is relatively small, varying between -0.15 and -0.39. Overall, this preliminary evidence would suggest that additional entry implies some business stealing but more important market expansion. This would in turn indicate that the ETRs are not a good measure of competition, as this is only the case when entry only leads to business stealing (coe¢ cient for ln N of -1). However, as already mentioned, we have not yet accounted for the endogeneity of N . Firms tend to locate in markets where they expect demand to be high, leading to a spurious correlation between the number of …rms and total market demand and an overestimate of the extent of market expansion. Our full model accounts for this, by estimating the revenue model simultaneously with the entry model, using market size as an exclusion restriction to identify the market expansion e¤ect.
Revenue model

Results from the full model
We now discuss the main empirical results, from estimating the entry and revenue model simultaneously. We …rst look at the case of butchers in detail, to give a comparison of the di¤erent speci…cations and methods. We then give a broader overview of all sectors, focusing on the estimated competition e¤ects or adjusted ETRs, which take into account the market expansion e¤ects from entry.
Comparison of di¤erent speci…cations and methods: butchers As discussed in section 3, we consider two speci…cations for the revenue equation. In the constant elasticity speci…cation (15), the number of entrants appears logarithmically, so N = ln(N ). In the …xed e¤ects speci…cation (16), we estimate the e¤ect of entry N on revenues for each market con…guration. For both speci…cations, we compare the results from simultaneous estimation of the demand and entry model with those from estimating the models separately. We focus the comparison on the revenue equation, since the results for the entry equation are very similar across speci…cations and methods (and given in Table 3 for the single equation estimation). Table 6 shows the results. The estimated e¤ects of the control variables X are very similar across di¤erent speci…cations, so we do not discuss them further. Our main interest is in the e¤ects of entry on revenues. First consider the constant elasticity speci…cation. When the revenue equation is estimated separately using OLS, we estimate = 0:24 (as already reported in Table 5 ). In sharp contrast, when the revenue equation is estimated simultaneously with the entry equation, we estimate = 0:72. Hence, accounting for the endogeneity of N implies a considerably higher estimate of business stealing. The market expansion elasticity, 1 + , correspondingly drops from 0.76 to 0.28. Intuitively, OLS gives a spurious …nding of market expansion, since it does not take into account that entrants tend to locate in markets where the unobserved demand error is high. 10 Nevertheless, the simultaneous model still implies there is some market expansion: an increase in N by 10% tends to raise market revenues by 2.8%. The bottom part of Table 6 shows how translates into percentage revenue e¤ects R(N )=R(N + 1). We see a declining pattern, where the e¤ect on total revenue per capita is 21% for the second entrant, 12% for the third entrant, 8% for the fourth entrant and 6% for the …fth entrant. This smooth pattern is evidently driven by the restricted functional form of the logarithmic speci…cation. Now consider the unrestricted …xed e¤ects speci…cation. We do not report the di¤erent N , but immediately discuss the implied percentage revenue e¤ects R(N )=R(N + 1). As before, we …nd large market expansion e¤ects from single equation estimation (e.g. 85% market expansion for the second entrant) and much lower e¤ects when we account for the endogeneity of N (26% for the second entrant). Furthermore, the ‡exible speci…cation no longer gives a smooth pattern for the entry e¤ects. Only the second butcher leads to significant market expansion. For additional entrants, the extent of market expansion becomes insigni…cant.
In sum, this discussion shows that both the speci…cation and the method are important to correctly estimate the extent of market expansion. First, it is necessary to account for the endogeneity of entry since otherwise the extent of market expansion will be overestimated. Second, it may be important to consider the possibility of a ‡exible speci…cation for the entry e¤ects, though this comes at the cost of reduced precision. These conclusions do not just hold for butchers but also for the other sectors we have studied. They will therefore be highly relevant when estimating the competition e¤ects based on the adjusted ETRs. Table 7 shows the competition e¤ects from additional entry, as estimated from the simultaneous entry and revenue model. As is clear from (19) and (20), the competition e¤ects can be interpreted as adjusted ETRs: they adjust the traditional ETRs for the extent of market expansion induced by entry. Only if market expansion is small, the competition e¤ects will be close to the traditional ETR's.
Competition e¤ects from entry: all sectors
The top panel of Table 7 shows the results for the constant elasticity revenue speci…cation. The …rst row shows the estimated business stealing e¤ects from the revenue equation. For six out of seven sectors, the estimates are much closer to -1 than in the earlier OLS estimates of Table 5 . This means that the necessary adjustments of the ETRs are much smaller as earlier suggested. Nevertheless, the market expansion elasticity 1+ is still important, varying from 0.08 for bakeries to 0.72 for ‡orists.
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Based on (20), we can use the 's and the ETRs (very similar to those in Table 4 ) to compute the markup e¤ects or "adjusted ETRs". For most sectors and market con…gurations we …nd signi…cant competition e¤ects from entry. The adjusted ETRs are typically signi…cantly greater than 1, also for entry by the second …rm, and they are never signi…cantly below 1. For example, entry by a second restaurant reduces markups by 17% ( (1)= (2) = 1:17). This contrasts with our earlier estimated simple ETRs, which were often signi…cantly less than 1 for the second entrant (e.g. ET R(2) = 0:87 for restaurants). The reason is, of course, that we now adjust for the extent of market expansion. Bakeries are the only sector without signi…cant competition e¤ects from entry in the constant elasticity speci…cation. We already found the traditional ETRs to be close to 1 in this sector. Moreover, it turns out that entry by bakeries largely entails business stealing ( = 0:92), so that the adjusted ETRs remain close to and not signi…cantly di¤erent from 1.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows whether these conclusions are con…rmed using the more ‡exible …xed e¤ects revenue speci…cation. The estimated competition e¤ects of the second entrant are broadly similar. In …ve out of seven sectors, the second entrant has a signi…cant e¤ect on competition. The two exceptions are bakeries (as before) and real estate agents where (1)= (2) does not di¤er signi…cantly from 1. However, the conclusions regarding competition from the third, fourth or …fth entrant are di¤erent from the restricted speci…cation. With the exception of restaurants, we no longer estimate signi…cant competition e¤ects from the third entrant onwards. Note, however, that the standard errors of the estimated (N 1)= (N ) have become larger (because of the increased ‡exibility), so that the competition tests have less power.
Combining the results from the restricted constant elasticity speci…cation (with more precise estimates) and the more ‡exible …xed e¤ects speci…cation (with larger standard errors), we conclude that in most sectors the second entrant appears to reduce markups by at least 30%, whereas further entrants may not necessarily promote competition further. Bakeries and real estate agents are exceptions to this conclusion. For real estate agents, the …xed e¤ects speci…cation does not estimate signi…cant competition e¤ects from the second entrant, though the standard errors are rather large here.
12 For bakeries, the lack of 11 Only for real estate agents is not signi…cant. This suggests considerable market expansion, perhaps capturing that market de…nition is broader than the town level for this sector. 12 A lack of competition e¤ects from entry in the real estate sector is consistent with the common practice of more or less uniform percentage commissions. This has also been documented elsewhere, for example 22 competition e¤ects appears more strongly: both the constant elasticity and the …xed e¤ects speci…cation indicate that the second entrant does not promote competition. Incidentally, this is consistent with a recent decision by the Belgian Council of Competition. In January 2008, the Council convicted the Association of Bakeries for continuing its price …xing policies after prices for bread had been liberalized in 2006.
Conclusions
We have proposed a methodology for estimating the competition e¤ects from entry in differentiated products markets, and illustrated how to implement it using datasets for seven di¤erent local service sectors. We started from Bresnahan and Reiss'ETRs, and provided conditions under which they can be used as a test for the presence and a measure for the magnitude of competition e¤ects from entry. We subsequently showed how to augment the traditional entry model with a revenue equation. This revenue equation serves to adjust the traditional ETRs by the extent of market expansion due to entry, leading to an unbiased estimate of the competition e¤ects from entry. Our empirical results show that traditional ETRs are close to one, suggesting limited competition e¤ects, and in some cases even signi…cantly below 1, suggesting entry would reduce competition. Furthermore, we …nd that entry leads to signi…cant market expansion, which implies that the traditional ETRs underestimate the e¤ects of entry on competition. Accounting for the estimated market expansion, we no longer …nd adjusted ETRs that are signi…cantly below 1. In most sectors, the second entrant reduces markups by at least 30%, whereas the third or higher entrants have smaller or insigni…cant e¤ects. In at least one sector, bakeries, we have found that even the second entrant does not create competition, which is consistent with a recent decision by the competition authority.
Our empirical analysis stressed the importance of several speci…c issues that should be taken into account. First, it is important to account for the endogeneity of the number of entrants in estimating market expansion e¤ects from entry. Failure to do so would result in an overestimate of market expansion e¤ects, and hence an overestimate of the competition e¤ects (adjusted ETRs), as opposed to an underestimate from the traditional ETRs. In our setting, population size arises as a natural instrument, and we found the bias from ignoring the endogeneity issue can be substantial.
Second, it is potentially important to consider a ‡exible revenue speci…cation to estimate the market expansion e¤ects. Our restricted constant elasticity speci…cation (with ln N ) imposes market expansion e¤ects to be declining in N , whereas our more ‡exible …xed e¤ects Hsieh and Moretti (2003) , who draw implications for the e¢ ciency of entry. speci…cation allows the e¤ects to vary per consecutive entrant. The ‡exible speci…cation suggested that the main market expansion e¤ects (and hence required adjustment to the ETRs) come from the second entrant, and less so from the additional entrants. However, this speci…cation also entails less precise parameter estimates. Future research would be desirable to shed further light on this. For example, one may collect more data, or use alternative speci…cations with more structure from a speci…c model of product di¤erentiation.
Due to the relative simplicity of our methodology, it was possible to consider quite a number of di¤erent local service sectors. Nevertheless, more work on di¤erent sectors and di¤erent countries would be useful to further evaluate the bene…ts and limitations of our approach. We hope the increased availability of revenue data at the detailed company level will stimulate such research. Table 3 , using expression (12) evaluated at the sample means of the variables. The entry threshold ratios (ETR) are based on the cut-points N , using expression (13). All ETs are signi…cant with standard errors varying around 150. For the ETRs, a "*" indicates that the ETR di¤ers signi…cantly from 1. Notes: The parameter estimates are based on OLS estimation of the restricted revenue speci…-cation (15). A "*" indicates that the parameter di¤ers signi…cantly from 0 at the 5% level. Table 3 . A "*" indicates that the parameter di¤ers signi…cantly from 0 at the 5% level. For the constant elasticity speci…cation, Table 7 also shows the business stealing e¤ect , used to adjust the ETR. A "*" indicates that the markup e¤ect di¤ers signi…cantly from 1.
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